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7 
GENETIC DATA IN TOXIC TORT 
LITIGATION 
 
Gary E. Marchant* 
INTRODUCTION 
There are major data gaps and uncertainties about the health 
risks of most potentially toxic substances. When the question in a 
toxic tort case is whether a particular toxic substance caused injury 
in a specific individual, the data gaps and uncertainties are even 
greater. Most disease conditions have multiple potential etiologies, 
and there is usually no direct evidence of which possible cause 
produced the disease in a specific individual. Moreover, each 
person is unique in his or her susceptibility to toxic agents, further 
complicating the inquiry into what caused illness in that individual. 
Yet, it is precisely into this black hole of ignorance and uncertainty 
that judges and juries must venture to resolve whether a particular 
exposure caused an individual plaintiff’s illness. Not surprisingly, 
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the outcome in such toxic tort cases is often uncertain, contentious, 
and unjust. 
New genetic methods and data have the potential to fill some 
of the scientific uncertainties and data gaps in toxic tort litigation, 
thus making toxic tort litigation more accurate and fair. At the 
same time, these same genetic data also have the potential to make 
toxic tort litigation even more complex, contentious, and ethically 
problematic. One thing is certain, genetic data have the potential to 
fundamentally transform toxic tort litigation. Courts can expect 
this significant transformation to take place over the next decade. 
Two types of genetic data are likely to have the biggest impact in 
toxic tort litigation: (i) data on genetic susceptibility of individual 
plaintiffs, and (ii) genetic biomarkers  of exposure and effect. This 
paper explores the potential applications of these two types of 
genetic information in toxic tort litigation, as well as the potential 
benefits and risks of such applications. 
I. GENETIC SUSCEPTIBILITY DATA 
The genes that code for enzymes involved in the metabolism of 
foreign substances entering the body, including pollutants and 
other toxic substances, appear to be highly variable between 
individuals.1 Genetic variations (“polymorphisms”) that affect 
susceptibility have been identified for most toxic substances that 
have received significant regulatory scrutiny.2 Some of these 
polymorphisms are very common in the population, while others 
are rare. For example, almost fifty percent of Caucasians lack a 
                                                          
1 INTERNATIONAL AGENCY FOR RESEARCH ON CANCER (IARC), 
METABOLIC POLYMORPHISMS AND SUSCEPTIBILITY TO CANCER, IARC 
SCIENTIFIC PUBLICATIONS NO. 148 (P. Vineis et al. eds., 1999); Frederica 
Gemignani et al., A Catalogue of Polymorphisms Related to Xenobiotic 
Metabolism and Cancer Susceptibility, 12 PHARMACOGENETICS 459 (2002) 
(identifying 313 known experimentally confirmed polymorphisms in 54 
candidate genes affecting cancer susceptibility from exposure to toxic 
substances). 
2 Gary E. Marchant, Genomics and Toxic Substances: Part II - Genetic 
Susceptibility to Environmental Agents, 33 ENVTL. L. REP. 10641, 10644-45 
(2003) [hereinafter Marchant, Genomics and Toxic Substances]. 
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functional copy of the gene coding for the important metabolic 
enzyme glutathione S-transferase M, increasing their risks to toxic 
substances such as polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs) and 
aflatoxin.3 The Environmental Human Genome Project has 
identified over 500 putative environmental susceptibility genes, 
and is now in the process of fully characterizing mutations in these 
genes conferring susceptibility or resilience to toxic substances in 
individuals carrying the genes.4 As discussed below, these findings 
of genetic susceptibility have many potential applications to toxic 
torts. 
1.  Proving or Disproving Causation 
Plaintiffs in toxic tort lawsuits must prove that the toxic 
substances to which they were exposed caused their illness. To 
satisfy this causation requirement, some (but not all) courts require 
that plaintiffs demonstrate that the defendant’s action doubled their 
background risk (i.e., relative risk > 2.0) such that the exposure 
was “more likely than not” the cause of the illness in the 
individual.5 Plaintiffs often cannot meet this demanding 
                                                          
3 Lawrence S. Engel et al., Pooled Analysis and Meta-Analysis of 
Glutathione S-Transferase M1 and Bladder Cancer: A HuGE Review, 156 AM. 
J. EPIDEMIOL. 95 (2002); Radim J. Sram, Effect of Glutathione S-Transferase 
M1 Polymorphisms on Biomarkers of Exposure and Effects, 106 ENVTL. 
HEALTH PERSP. 231, 231–32 (1998). Polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs) 
are a group of over 100 different chemicals that are formed from the incomplete 
combustion of coal, oil, gas, garbage, tobacco and charbroiled meat. Aflatoxins 
are naturally occurring carcinogens produced by certain species of fungus that 
are toxic and carcinogenic to animals, and can contaminate nuts, cereal 
grains,and spices, as well as the milk of cows that eat contaminated crops. 
4 Jocelyn Kaiser, Tying Genetics to the Risk of Environmental Diseases, 
300 SCIENCE 563 (2003); Julie Wakefield, Environmental Genome Project: 
Focusing on Differences to Understand the Whole, 110 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 
A757, A758 (2002). The website for the Environmental Genome Project is at 
http://www.niehs.nih.gov/envgenom/home.htm. 
5 See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1321 (9th 
Cir. 1995); Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1403-04 (D. Or. 
1996). See Russellyn S. Carruth & Bernard D. Goldstein, Relative Risk Greater 
Than Two in Proof of Causation in Toxic Tort Litigation, 41 JURIMETRICS J. 195 
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requirement.6 Evidence of genetic susceptibility, however, may 
assist some susceptible individuals in overcoming this hurdle. 
Even if epidemiology studies show that the relative risk in the 
general population is less than two, genetically susceptible 
plaintiffs could argue that their individual risk is higher than the 
general population due to their susceptibility, and may exceed the 
two-fold legal threshold.7 
 In several cases, plaintiffs have already advanced claims of 
genetic susceptibility to try to circumvent causation barriers to 
recovery. For example, some silicone breast implant plaintiffs 
relied on a published study allegedly identifying a gene variant 
conferring susceptibility to silicone8 to argue they may have been 
harmed by silicone leaking from their implants even if 
epidemiology studies showed no significant increase in disease 
associated with silicone breast implants in the general population.9 
Similarly, thyroid cancer victims living near the Hanford nuclear 
facility argued that their background risk doubled from exposure to 
radioactive wastes from the facility when their alleged genetic 
susceptibility to ionizing radiation was factored in. Specifically, 
they claimed this genetic susceptability justified a five-fold 
reduction in the exposure levels necessary to double background 
                                                          
(2001) (listing cases that require relative risk > 2.0 and those that do not). 
6 Carruth & Goldstein, supra note 5. 
7 See, e.g., Hall, 947 F. Supp. at 1398 n.26 (stating that even when 
statistical study shows relative risk less than two, some plaintiffs may still 
recover if they can “demonstrate that they differ in some significant way from 
the subjects of the statistical study”); Daubert, 43 F.3d at 1321 n.16 (“A 
statistical study showing a relative risk of less than two could be combined with 
other evidence to show that it is more likely than not that the accused cause is 
responsible for as particular plaintiff’s injury,” but in this particular case the 
“plaintiffs’ experts did not seek to differentiate these plaintiffs from the subjects 
of the statistical studies.”). 
8 V. Leroy Young et al., HLA Typing in Women with Breast Implants, 96 
PLASTIC & RECONSTRUCTIVE SURGERY 1497, 1508 (1995). 
9 See Hall, 947 F. Supp. at 1456; Ernest H. Hornsby & Dianna Pendleton, 
Plaintiffs’ Mounting Case Against Silicone Gel Breast Implants, 6 MEDICAL-
LEGAL ASPECTS OF BREAST IMPLANTS 4, 5 (1998); Gary E. Marchant, Genetic 
Susceptibility and Biomarkers in Toxic Injury Litigation, 41 JURIMETRICS J. 67, 
91-92 (2000) [hereinafter Marchant, Genetic Susceptibility]. 
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risk.10 These claims have generally failed to date because the 
plaintiffs simply pointed to evidence of a genetic susceptibility in 
the general population without introducing evidence that they 
themselves carried the relevant susceptibility-conferring gene.11 To 
prevail on such arguments in the future, plaintiffs will likely need 
to undergo genetic testing to substantiate their claims of genetic 
susceptibility.12 
A case which demonstrates this approach and its potential, 
even though the result (both scientific and legal) in this particular 
case was not favorable to the plaintiff, is Easter v. Aventis Pastuer, 
Inc.13 The plaintiffs in this case alleged that thimerosal, a mercury 
preservative in the defendant’s pediatric vaccines, caused their son, 
Jordan Easter’s, autism. The plaintiffs contended that “some 
children are genetically susceptible to mercury poisoning and 
cannot excrete or otherwise eliminate the mercury in the vaccine 
preservative.”14 Unfortunately for the plaintiff in this case, genetic 
testing revealed that he did not have the pertinent genetic 
susceptibility. As described by the court, the plaintiff concedes that 
he “cannot prove, in Jordan’s case, that his autism was caused by 
thimerosal . . . because Jordan does not meet the genetic profile for 
                                                          
10 In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig., 1998 WL 775340 (E.D. Wash. 
1998). See Marchant, Genetic Susceptibility, supra note 9, at 90-91. 
11 Hanford, 1998 WL 775340, at *70 (explaining that the use of 
susceptibility factor to calculate plaintiffs’ risk from radiation exposure must be 
rejected because “of the present reality that there is no way to identify persons 
who are allegedly more susceptible to radiation-induced thyroid cancer, nor can 
alleged differences in susceptibility be quantified”); Hall v. Baxter Healthcare 
Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1456 (D. Or. 1996) (rejecting introduction of 
evidence of genetic susceptibility to silicone because the breast implant 
plaintiffs had failed to show that they carried the specific genes allegedly 
conferring susceptibility). 
12 See, e.g., Woolf v. Consolidated NDE, Inc., 796 A.2d 906, 908, 912 n.1 
(N.J. Super. Ct. 2001) (holding that the worker’s compensation claimant 
successfully demonstrated that occupational exposures most likely caused his 
leukemia in part by showing that he carried a chromosomal abnormality known 
as a “Philadelphia chromosome” which made him genetically predisposed to 
developing leukemia). 
13 358 F. Supp. 2d 576 (E.D. Tex. 2005). 
14 Id. at 575. 
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children who . . . are at increased risk for developing autism by 
thimerosal.”15 This concession was “the beginning and the end” of 
the court’s ruling to exclude the testimony of the plaintiff’s 
causation expert.16 In this case, the genetic test results were 
decisive for a decision adverse to the plaintiffs, whereas genetic 
test results showing that the plaintiff did carry the alleged 
susceptibility-conferring gene may well have produced a different 
outcome. 
As demonstrated by the Easter case, defendants might use the 
absence of the pertinent susceptibility genes in a plaintiff to 
buttress their arguments against causation.  Additionally, 
defendants could also seek to test plaintiffs for the presence of 
other genetic traits that might predispose the plaintiffs to the 
illnesses they have developed.  Defendants would use such 
findings to support alternative causation arguments, namely, that 
the plaintiffs’ own genotypes, rather than exposure to the 
defendants’ toxic substances, caused or contributed to the 
plaintiffs’ illnesses. Some defendants have already asserted such 
alternative causation defenses based on genetic susceptibility, but 
like many genetic claims by plaintiffs, these defenses often fail 
because the claims are not supported by specific evidence that the 
individual plaintiffs at issue had the relevant genetic variant.17 
There are, however, a few known examples where defendants 
have sought genetic testing of plaintiffs for the purpose of showing 
potential alternative causes of the claimants’ condition.18 In one 
                                                          
15 Id. 
16 Id. at 579. 
17 See, e.g., Willey v. Ketterer, 869 F.2d 648 (1st Cir. 1989) (finding that 
the defendant’s argument that genetic predisposition caused plaintiff’s cerebral 
palsy rather than medical malpractice was not supported by valid evidence and 
hence prejudicial to jury); Davanzo v. Fisher, 758 N.Y.S.2d 49, 50 (Sup. Ct. 
2003) (upholding dismissal of defendant’s “genetic predisposition defense” 
because “there was no evidentiary basis for the defense”); Dombrowski v. Gould 
Elecs., 85 F. Supp. 2d. 456, 477 (M.D. Pa. 2000) (“There is a distinct lack of 
credible testimony . . . showing that genetics or family environments did, in fact 
cause the difficulties suffered by these individual Plaintiffs.”). 
18 In one high-profile case, the Burlington-Northern Railway secretly 
genetically tested workers for a genetic trait that allegedly could be an 
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case, a chemical company defendant successfully obtained a court 
order to test for the genetically-determined fragile X syndrome in a 
mentally-retarded child whose condition was allegedly caused by 
his mother’s workplace exposure to defendant’s solvents.19 In 
another case, the defendant obtained genetic testing of a plaintiff 
whose birth defect was allegedly caused by prenatal exposure to 
Benlate and demonstrated, to the satisfaction of both the plaintiff’s 
lead expert and the court, that the disability was caused by a 
specific inherited genetic mutation rather than chemical 
exposure.20 
These cases illustrate that plaintiffs’ genetic traits, which 
increase susceptibility for a particular toxic substance or create a 
predisposition to disease without any environmental exposure, can 
be used to argue for or against causation. The lesson learned from 
attempts to use such genetic claims or defenses to date is that to be 
successful, such arguments must be supported by genetic test data 
from the individual plaintiff showing the presence or absence of 
the genetic trait at issue. Given the potential usefulness of such 
genetic data in both proving or disproving causation, it is likely 
that both plaintiffs and defendants will increasingly seek to obtain 
and introduce such evidence in future toxic tort cases. One expert 
has even suggested that it should become “standard practice” for 
                                                          
alternative cause of the workers’ carpal tunnel syndrome. See Equal 
Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. Burlington N. Santa Fe R.R., No. C01-
4013 MWB, settlement reached (N.D. Iowa, Apr. 17, 2001); Tamar Lewin, 
Commission Sues Railroad to End Genetic Testing in Work Injury Cases, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 10, 2001, at A10. See also Bourkney v. New York Infirmary-
Beekman Downtown (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2002), reported at 228 N.Y.L.J. 18 (Nov. 
19, 2002) (granting defendant hospital’s motion to compel genetic testing of 
plaintiff in medical malpractice case). 
19 See Sally Lehrman, Pushing Limits of DNA Testing: Suit Prompts Study 
Into Whether a Birth Defect Was Inherited or Caused by Toxics, SAN 
FRANCISCO EXAMINER, June 5, 1994, at A1; Marchant, Genetic Susceptibility, 
supra note 9, at 99-100. This case settled on terms favorable to the plaintiff 
when genetic testing of the mother indicated that she did not carry the fragile X 
trait, and thus the son with the disability who necessarily received his X 
chromosome from his mother also could not have had the fragile X trait. Id. 
20 Bowen v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., No. Civ. 97C-06-194 CH, 
2005 WL 1952859 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 5, 2005). 
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defendants to seek genetic testing of plaintiffs in order to identify 
potential alternative causes.21 
2.  Duty to Protect or Warn Genetically Susceptible Plaintiffs? 
Another set of legal issues will revolve around the duty of a 
product manufacturer to protect or warn genetically susceptible 
individuals in the population. Defendants are likely to argue that 
they should have no duty to protect individuals with rare genetic 
susceptibilities to their products, perhaps invoking a doctrine 
known as the “idiosyncratic response” defense.22 This defense has 
traditionally been applied to protect a manufacturer from liability 
for a product such as a cosmetic that appears safe to the general 
population but may cause an unusual response in individuals with a 
rare allergy or sensitivity to the product. As one court stated, “[a] 
manufacturer has no duty to withhold its product from the market 
merely because the product may pose a risk to certain 
                                                          
21 Diane E. Lewis, Under a Genetic Cloud: The Benefits of DNA Testing 
Come with a Potential for Abuse, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 14, 1994, at A1 
(quoting Philip Reilly, a lawyer/doctor who at the time was Executive Director 
of the Eunice Kennedy Shriver Center for Mental Retardation and is now CEO 
of Interleuken Genetics, Inc.). 
22 See Marchant, Genetic Susceptability, supra note 9, at 80-84; John 
Gerald Gleeson, Idiosyncrasy: A Developing Defense in Drug and Hazardous 
Substances Litigation, FOR THE DEFENSE, Apr. 1989, at 9; Joseph J. Ortego et 
al., Idiosyncratic Reactions: A Limitation on the Duty to Warn, 8-14 MEALEY’S 
EMERGING TOXIC TORTS 35, Oct. 20, 1999. The idiosyncratic response defense 
only applies in strict liability cases, because in negligence cases where the 
defendant has separately been shown to have acted unreasonably, it is held liable 
for the unforeseen harm to an unusually susceptible individual under the 
“eggshell skull” doctrine. See Vosburg v. Putney, 50 N.W. 403, 404 (Wis. 1891) 
(“[T]he rule of damages in actions for torts . . . [is] that the wrongdoer is liable 
for all injuries resulting directly from the wrongful act, whether they could or 
could not have been foreseen by him.”). See also Gary L. Bahr & Bruce N. 
Graham, The Thin Skull Plaintiff Concept: Evasive or Persuasive, 15 LOY. L.A. 
L. REV. 409 (1982). The eggshell skull doctrine applies only where the 
defendant has been negligent, and does not apply in strict liability cases. Id. at 
409. 
MARCHANT MACROED.DOC 4/6/2006  2:28 PM 
 GENETIC DATA IN TOXIC TORT LITIGATION 15 
 
hypersensitive individuals.”23 
An example of how the idiosyncratic response defense could 
be applied to genetically susceptible individuals is provided by 
Cavallo v. Star Enterprise,24 though the case itself does not involve 
genetic susceptibility and does not cite the idiosyncratic response 
defense by name. In this case, a resident living near a petroleum 
distribution terminal claimed she became ill from inhaling fuel 
vapors released by a spill from the facility.25 The plaintiff alleged 
that she was “highly susceptible” to fuel vapors, in part to explain 
why she was adversely affected while many of her neighbors were 
not.26 The  Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that 
liability can only be imposed for adverse effects that would be 
suffered by a “normal” person, and thus the plaintiff’s own 
allegation that she was unusually susceptible precluded her 
claim.27 
While defendants may be able to use the existence of unusual 
genetic susceptibility to escape legal liability in some cases, 
plaintiffs may be able to use such susceptibilities to impose 
additional duties on manufacturers in other cases. Specifically, a 
plaintiff may argue that a manufacturer had a legal duty to warn 
product users that they may be genetically susceptible to the 
manufacturer’s product. The first such cases have already been 
filed, alleging that the LYMErix vaccine, the only biologic 
approved to protect against Lyme Disease, caused a chronic 
autoimmune reaction in approximately thirty percent of the 
population who carry a specific genetic polymorphism.28 The 
                                                          
23 Bingham v. Terminix Int’l Co., 896 F. Supp. 642, 645 (S.D. Miss. 1995). 
In this case, a homeowner who allegedly developed asthma as a result of 
termiticides applied in his home alleged that the manufacturer and applicator of 
the termiticide had a duty to protect “hypersensitive” individuals such as 
himself. Id. 
24 100 F.3d 1150 (4th Cir. 1996). 
25 Id. at 1153. 
26 Id. at 1154. 
27 Id. 
28 Amended Complaint at ¶ 10, Cassidy v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., No. 
99-10423, 2003 WL 22216528 (Pa. Com. Pl. July 1, 2003). See also Holcomb 
B. Noble, Concerns Grow Over Reactions To Lyme Shots, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 
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lawsuits argued that the manufacturer had a legal duty to not only 
warn vaccine users that a potential genetic susceptibility to the 
vaccine is prevalent in the population, but also that vaccine users 
should obtain a genetic test for the susceptibility gene before 
taking the vaccine.29 Although both the manufacturer and federal 
regulators disputed the factual premises of the lawsuit,30 the cases 
were settled before trial and the vaccine was subsequently removed 
from the market.31 These cases are the first in what is likely to 
become an increasingly frequent type of legal claim in which a 
plaintiff contends that a manufacturer has a duty to identify and 
warn about possible genetic susceptibilities to its products. 
 
3.  Other Potential Applications of Genetic Susceptibility Data 
There are several other potential applications of genetic 
susceptibility data in toxic tort litigation, some of which have 
already commenced. One such use is for defendants to cite to the 
genetic heterogeneity within the population with respect to 
susceptibility to a product or substance at issue in arguing against 
                                                          
2000, at F1 (reporting that class-action lawsuits have also been filed in New 
York and New Jersey in addition to the original Pennsylvania suit). 
29 Amended Complaint at ¶ ¶ 38, 48, Cassidy, No. 99-10423. 
30 See CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, 
Recommendations for the Use of Lyme Disease Vaccine, MORBIDITY & 
MORTALITY WEEKLY REP.: RECOMMENDATIONS & REPORTS 1, 8 (1999), 
available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/PDF/RR/RR4807.pdf (recognizing 
potential for autoimmune arthritis reaction in some patients but finding no 
evidence of such a response in pre-marketing clinical studies); Sarah L. Lathrop 
et al., Adverse Event Reports Following Vaccination for Lyme Disease: Dec. 
1998-July 2000, 20 VACCINE 1603-08 (2002) (describing how the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention post-marketing analysis found no increase in 
adverse reactions from LYMErix vaccine). 
31 See Manufacturer Discontinues Only Lyme Disease Vaccine, FDA 
CONSUMER, May-June 2002, at 5, available at http://www.fda.gov/fdac/ 
departs/2002/302_upd.html#lyme (“Initially, hundreds of thousands of people 
received the vaccine. However, sales plummeted after highly publicized reports 
that some users suffered arthritis-like symptoms, muscle pain and other ailments 
following vaccination.”). 
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class certification of plaintiffs in a potential class action lawsuit. 
As a practical matter, class certification is often critical for a 
lawsuit to proceed, but certification requires a finding by the court 
that the common issues that apply to the entire putative class 
“predominate” over individual issues.32 Some defendants have 
successfully argued that differences in genetic susceptibility to a 
product requires individualized assessments of risk and causation, 
thereby helping to defeat the requirement that common issues 
predominate, resulting in denial of class certification.33 These 
initial successes in citing to genetic differences in susceptibility 
will likely result in more defendants relying on such arguments in 
future potential class actions. 
Judges may allow juries to use information on a plaintiff’s 
genetic predisposition to disease to determine the damages to be 
paid to a plaintiff that has prevailed on the merits of a lawsuit. A 
defendant could try to exploit the plaintiff’s genetic predisposition 
to disease by arguing that the damages should be discounted due to 
the plaintiff’s increased risk of disease. In other words, a plaintiff 
injured by the defendant’s actions who happened to have a genetic 
predisposition that reduced his or her life expectancy independent 
of the tortious injury may have their damages discounted 
accordingly.34 The most closely analogous precedent are cases 
                                                          
32 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
33 Mahoney v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 204 F.R.D. 150, 161 (S.D. Iowa 
2001) (denying certification to class of long-time smokers with lung cancer); 
Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Super. Ct., 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d 652, 657-58 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2000) (denying class certification for medical monitoring claims brought 
by residents allegedly put at increased risk from chemical contamination of 
groundwater, in part because of potential individual differences in health 
backgrounds of the plaintiffs, including genetic predispositions); Cosentino v. 
Philip Morris Inc., No. MID-L-5135-97, 1998 WL 34168879, at *10 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. Feb. 11, 1999) (Opinion of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration of 
Class Certification) (denying class certification because issue of whether 
smoking caused a smoker’s illness will require an assessment of each individual 
smoker’s medical and genetic history); Reed v. Philip Morris Inc., Civil No. 96-
5070, 1997 WL 538921 (D.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 18, 1997) (denying class 
certification of all District of Columbia smokers). 
34 E.g., Kegel v. United States, 289 F. Supp. 790 (D. Mont. 1968) (holding 
that the plaintiff’s recovery should be discounted to the lost income and pain and 
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where courts have ordered HIV testing of plaintiffs to determine if 
their damage awards should be discounted due to their reduced life 
expectancy based on their future development of AIDS.35 Courts 
will have to determine whether, and under what circumstances, 
defendants can request genetic testing of plaintiffs for the purpose 
of determining genetic risks affecting life expectancy.36 
II. GENETIC BIOMARKERS OF EXPOSURE OR EFFECT 
Genetic biomarkers of exposure or effect are the second major 
type of genetic information that is likely to be used in toxic tort 
litigation. A biomarker is a molecular change in blood or some 
other tissue of a person exposed to a toxic substance which can be 
used to qualitatively or quantitatively diagnose the individual’s 
exposure (biomarker of exposure) or the early, pre-symptomatic 
progression of the disease process (biomarker of effect).37 Several 
types of genetic biomarkers exist. The most commonly used and 
best-validated, but the least agent-specific, genetic biomarker are 
chromosomal rearrangements such as translocations.38 Another 
                                                          
suffering that the plaintiff will incur in the two year period immediately 
following the accident after finding that the plaintiff would have developed the 
same condition within two years because of a preexisting condition). 
35 Pettyjohn v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., No. Civ.A. 91-CV-2681, 
1992 WL 105162 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 29, 1992) (ordering HIV testing); Agosto v. 
Trusswal Sys. Corp., 142 F.R.D. 118 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (ordering disclosure of 
HIV test results). See also Anthony S. Niedwiecki, Science Fact or Science 
Fiction? The Implications of Court-Ordered Genetic Testing Under Rule 35, 34 
U.S.F. L. REV. 295, 295 (2000). 
36 A trial judge has the discretion to order genetic testing of a plaintiff 
under Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure if good cause for such 
testing is shown. Mark A. Rothstein, Preventing the Discovery of Plaintiff 
Genetic Profiles by Defendants Seeking to Limit Damages in Personal Injury 
Litigation, 71 IND. L.J. 877, 889-91 (1996); Marchant, Genetic Susceptibility, 
supra note 9, at 106-07. 
37 Anthony P. Decaprio, Biomarkers: Coming of Age for Environmental 
Health and Risk Assessment, 31 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 1837, 1838 (1997). 
38 James D. Tucker, Use of Chromosome Translocations for Measuring 
Prior Environmental Exposures in Humans, in BIOMARKERS: MEDICAL AND 
WORKPLACE APPLICATIONS 117-32 (Mortimer L. Mendelsohn et al., eds., 1998), 
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type of biomarker involves specific mutations in the genes of an 
exposed person, which may be informative of the specific agent 
that caused the mutation.39 The most promising types of genetic 
biomarkers for the future, because of both their potential sensitivity 
and specificity, are toxicogenomic changes consisting of changes 
in gene expression, protein concentrations, or metabolite profiles.40 
The discussion below focuses primarily on gene expression 
changes, whereby toxic chemicals produce characteristic changes 
in which genes get turned on or off in cells, which can be measured 
using “microarrays” that compare changes in gene expression 
following an external stimulus.41 
1. Proving or Disproving Exposure 
Perhaps the most promising application of genetic biomarkers 
in toxic tort litigation is in demonstrating and even quantifying 
                                                          
available at http://www.nap.edu/openbook/0309064228/html117/html. A 
translocation involves the breakage and removal of a large segment of DNA 
from one chromosome, followed by the segment’s attachment to a different 
chromosome. See NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, NATIONAL HUMAN 
GENOME RESEARCH INSTITUTE TALKING GLOSSARY OF GENETIC TERMS, 
http://www.genome.gov/glossary.cfm?key=translocation. 
39 See, e.g., Ian C. Semenza & Lisa H. Weasel, Molecular Epidemiology in 
Environmental Health: The Potential of Tumor Suppressor Gene p53 as a 
Biomarker, 105 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 155, 155–56 (Supp. 1 1997); Steven J. 
Smith et al., Molecular Epidemiology of p53 Protein Mutations in Workers 
Exposed to Vinyl Chloride, 147 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 302, 302–03 (1998). See 
generally Gary E. Marchant, Genetics and Toxic Torts, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 
949, 971-72 (2001). 
40 Marilyn J. Aardema & James T. MacGregor, Toxicology and Genetic 
Toxicology in the New Era of “Toxicogenomics”: Impact of “-Omics” 
Technologies, 499 MUTATION RES. 13 (2002); NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, 
TOXICOGENOMIC TECHNOLOGIES AND RISK ASSESSMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
CARCINOGENS: A WORKSHOP SUMMARY (2005), available at http://www.nap. 
edu/openbook/0309097002/html/R1/html [hereinafter Impact of “-Omics” 
Technologies]. 
41 Emile F. Nuwaysir et al., Microarrays and Toxicology: The Advent of 
Toxicogenetics, 24 MOLECULAR CARCINOGENESIS 153 (1999); Impact of “-
Omics” Technologies, supra note 40, at 13. 
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exposure. Many toxic tort cases involve sudden unexpected or 
previously undetected chronic environmental exposures, such as 
exposure to contaminated drinking water, hazardous chemicals 
released into the air, or hazardous worksites. Plaintiffs often are 
unaware that they are being exposed until after the fact, and 
frequently there are no direct measurements of the exposure that 
occurred. Yet, courts often insist that plaintiffs must adequately 
demonstrate and quantify their exposure to survive summary 
judgment.42 In one recent case a New York court dismissed the 
claims of a gas station worker who developed leukemia after being 
exposed to benzene in gasoline on a daily basis for seventeen years 
because he lacked any direct scientific data to quantify his 
exposure over that time period.43 
A case demonstrating both the potential for, and pitfalls of, 
using genetic biomarkers to prove exposure is the litigation 
involving the 1979 Three Mile Island nuclear reactor accident.44 
The plaintiffs, nearby residents who developed cancer,45 lacked 
any direct or modeling evidence to quantify exposure to an alleged 
plume of radioactive release they contended caused their tumors. 
Instead, they sought to demonstrate exposure using expert 
evidence purporting to show that the residents had an increased 
frequency of a specific chromosomal aberration (dicentric 
chromosomes) that is characteristic of radiation exposure. The 
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit validated the general 
approach of using such biomarkers to prove exposure, holding that 
such use of genetic markers “is an accepted method, not simply for 
determining if the subject of the analysis was irradiated, but also 
                                                          
42 E.g., Mitchell v. Gencorp Inc., 165 F.3d 778, 781 (10th Cir. 1999); Allen 
v. Pa. Eng’g Corp., 102 F.3d 194, 197 (5th Cir. 1996); Wright v. Williamette 
Indus., Inc., 91 F.3d 1105, 1107 (8th Cir. 1996). But see Westberry v. Gislaved 
Gummi AB, 178 F.3d 257, 264 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that plaintiff is not 
required to quantify toxic exposures because “only rarely are humans exposed to 
chemicals in a manner that permits a quantitative determination of adverse 
outcomes”). 
43 Parker v. Mobil Oil Corp., 793 N.Y.S.2d 434, 437-38 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2005). 
44 In re TMI Litigation, 193 F.3d 613, 622 (3d Cir. 1999). 
45 Id. 
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for estimating radiation dose to the individual.”46 Yet, the court 
ultimately held that the evidence could not be used to prove 
exposure in that case because while “[r]adiation dose estimation 
based on dicentric enumeration is a valid and reliable scientific 
methodology,” the “validity and reliability decrease as the time gap 
between the alleged irradiation and the dicentric count 
increases.”47 According to the court, dicentric chromosomes only 
provide an accurate indicator of dose within one or two years of 
exposure, but the plaintiffs attempted to use dicentric chromosome 
evidence collected over fifteen years after the exposure occurred, 
which may no longer be reliable.48 This case thus stands for the 
proposition that genetic markers can, in principle, be used to 
demonstrate and quantify exposure to a toxic agent, but the 
temporal dimensions of when the exposure occurred and when the 
exposure biomarkers were assayed will be critical to the 
admissibility of such evidence.49 
                                                          
46 Id. at 690. 
47 Id. at 692. 
48 Id. 
49 As biomarkers become more available, courts are increasingly likely to 
require such evidence to prove exposure. In one recent unreported California 
case, the court (arguably somewhat over-exuberantly) suggested just such a 
requirement for biomarker evidence: 
According to [defendant’s expert] Dr. Ordog, there are biological tests 
(biomarkers) that measure the levels of chemicals in the body to reveal 
whether these levels can exceed expected or accepted levels. 
Biomarkers can be performed utilizing blood, urine or fat samples 
taken from a live patient or at autopsy. Such markers can test for 
180,000 different chemicals, including the chemicals to which plaintiffs 
claim Mr. Cord [the plaintiff] was exposed resulting in his cancer. Dr. 
Ordog testified that because no such tests were performed on Mr. Cord, 
‘it is impossible to determine to a medical certainty’ whether Mr. 
Cord’s exposure, absorption or toxicity to benzene or other chemicals 
exceeded normal and expected levels. In other words, existing tests 
were available to measure whether Mr. Cord in fact had excessive 
exposure to benzene and other chemicals, but plaintiffs’ experts did not 
use them. 
Cord v. City of Los Angeles, 2004 WL 2189182, at *9 (Cal. App. Sept. 30, 
2004). 
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Based on such precedents, gene expression data using 
microarrays holds considerable promise for helping litigants prove 
or disprove that sufficient exposure occurred to cause particular 
injuries.50 Gene expression assays of the plaintiffs’ blood or skin 
cells may demonstrate the presence (or absence) of gene 
expression “fingerprints” that are characteristic of the toxic 
substance to which the plaintiff was allegedly exposed.51 Such an 
assay might even be capable of quantifying the level and duration 
of plaintiff’s exposure.52 Before being used for this purpose, it will 
be necessary to adequately validate the gene expression signature, 
including how such responses vary between different individuals, 
different tissues within the same individual, different microarray 
platforms made by different vendors, and different time courses of 
exposure. For example, most microarray experiments to date have 
only evaluated the effects of toxic exposure on gene expression for 
a few days after exposure. Longer-term studies will be needed to 
validate the gene expression changes that can be expected over 
many months or years of exposure, which are common for some 
chronic environmental exposures.53 Notwithstanding these caveats, 
gene expression microarrays have tremendous potential to provide 
objective, individualized data on exposure, which both plaintiffs 
and defendants will be able to use in appropriate cases. 
                                                          
50 See Gary E. Marchant, Toxicogenomics and Toxic Torts, 20 TRENDS IN 
BIOTECH. 329, 330 (2002) [hereinafter Marchant, Toxicogenomics and Toxic 
Torts]. 
51 Matthew Bartosiewicz, Sharron Penn & Alan Buckpitt, Applications of 
Gene Arrays in Environmental Toxicology: Fingerprints of Gene Regulation 
Associated with Calcium Chloride, Benzo(a)pyrene, and Trichloroethylene, 109 
ENVTL. HEALTH PERSPECT. 71, 73-74 (2001); Hisham K. Hamadeh et al., 
Prediction of Compound Signature Using High Density Gene Expression 
Profiling, 67 TOXICOL. SCI. 232 (2002). 
52 Marchant, Toxicogenomics and Toxic Torts, supra note 50, at 330. 
53 See Carol J. Henry et al., Use of Genomics in Toxicology and 
Epidemiology: Findings and Recommendations of a Workshop, 110 ENVTL. 
HEALTH PERSPECT. 1047, 1049 (2002) [hereinafter Findings and 
Recommendations of a Workshop] (“An additional challenge [of toxicogenomic 
methods] is to examine gene expression at the time period that is relevant to the 
health outcome of interest.”). 
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2.   General and Specific Causation 
Gene expression biomarkers have the potential to help prove or 
disprove both general and specific causation.54 Plaintiffs often fail 
to establish general causation because they are unable to introduce 
valid scientific data that links the specific toxic agent to which the 
plaintiff was exposed with the exact health endpoint he or she 
developed. In the absence of such data, plaintiffs often attempt to 
use available data that might show that a related substance causes 
the specific health effect incurred by the plaintiff, or data showing 
that the toxic agent the plaintiff was exposed to causes other 
adverse health effects that might involve similar etiologies as the 
health endpoint that is present in the plaintiff.55 These attempts to 
extrapolate general causation from closely related agents or 
endpoints usually fail as courts require direct evidence linking the 
specific health endpoint with the specific toxic agent at issue.56 
                                                          
54 General causation concerns whether the toxic agent at issue has the 
potential to cause a particular health effect in the general population. Specific 
causation inquires as to whether the toxic agent produced by defendant did in 
fact cause the adverse health effect in a specific plaintiff. 
55 See Daniel J. Capra, The Daubert Puzzle, 32 GA. L. REV. 699, 715-19 
(1998). 
56 See, e.g., Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 144 (1997) (discussing 
a study finding that PCBs cause alveologenic adenomas at high concentrations 
in mice cannot be used to show that PCBs caused plaintiff’s small-cell 
carcinoma); Allen v. Pa. Eng’g Corp., 102 F.3d 194, 197 (5th Cir. 1991) 
(discussing studies showing that a chemical causes cancer in blood cells cannot 
be used to argue that same chemical causes brain cancer); Lynch v. Merrell-
Nat’l Labs, 830 F.2d 1190, 1194 (1st Cir. 1987) (rejecting expert’s reliance on 
toxicological studies with “analogous chemicals” to show causation); Lockheed 
Litig. Cases, 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d 762, 774 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (stating that 
epidemiology studies showing one group of organic solvents causes disease 
cannot be used to support conclusion that the solvent plaintiffs were exposed to 
caused their disease in absence of evidence showing that the solvents share 
common chemical properties and toxicities). But see Donaldson v. Cent. Ill. Pub. 
Serv. Co., 767 N.E.2d 314, 328 (Ill. 2002) (explaining that Illinois permits 
extrapolation between similar but not identical cause and effect relationships in 
the “limited instances” where science is unable to directly establish cause of 
disease). 
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The challenge facing plaintiffs in proving general causation is 
thus much more daunting than, for example, the challenge facing a 
regulatory agency attempting to regulate the same substance. The 
regulatory agency need only show that the chemical might cause 
any adverse health effect in some people.57 In contrast, a toxic tort 
plaintiff has the burden of proving that the chemical did cause a 
specific adverse effect (i.e., that from which plaintiff suffers) in a 
particular individual. “Toxic ignorance,”58 or the lack of adequate 
testing data for many potential toxic substances, thus severely 
limits a plaintiff’s ability to introduce the required data on a 
specific chemical-health endpoint linkage. 
Gene expression biomarkers may be able to provide the direct 
evidentiary link needed to extrapolate results from analogous 
exposures or health endpoints. Unlike traditional toxicological 
studies such as a chronic bioassay, which can cost millions of 
dollars and take years to complete, gene expression assays can be 
undertaken for a few hundred dollars within a day or two.59 
Plaintiffs could use such quick and inexpensive assays to show that 
two related substances induce similar toxicological responses at the 
molecular level, or that two different toxicological endpoints, such 
as two different types of tumors, involve similar molecular 
pathways that can be altered by the same toxic chemical. If valid 
data using traditional well–accepted toxicological assays exist for 
the related toxic agent or health endpoint, the plaintiff may be able 
to ‘piggyback’ on those existing studies. Concordance in gene 
                                                          
57 For example, EPA may regulate a toxic chemical under the Toxic 
Substances Control Act (TSCA) if it finds that there is “a reasonable basis to 
conclude” that the chemical “presents or will present” an “unreasonable risk” of 
injury to members of the public. 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a) (2005). 
58 ENVTL. DEFENSE FUND, TOXIC IGNORANCE, THE CONTINUING ABSENCE 
OF BASIC HEALTH TESTING FOR TOP SELLING CHEMICALS IN THE UNITED 
STATES (1997), http://www.envirnmental defense.org/documents/ 
243_toxicignorance.pdf; GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CHEMICAL 
REGULATION: OPTIONS EXIST TO IMPROVE EPA’S ABILITY TO ASSESS HEALTH 
RISKS AND MANAGE ITS CHEMICAL REVIEW PROGRAM (2005), 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05458.pdf. 
59 See Gary E. Marchant, Genomics and Toxic Substances: Part I–
Toxicogenomics, 33 ENVTL. L. REP. 10071, 10082-83 (2003). 
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expression results may show that the related agent or endpoint at 
issue in plaintiff’s case is indeed related to the better studied 
related agent.60 
Gene expression data may also be helpful in assessing specific 
causation. There are no existing types of data that can directly 
demonstrate that a toxic agent caused illness in a specific 
individual.61 In the words of one court, “science cannot tell us what 
caused a particular plaintiff’s injury.”62 Consequently, the tort 
system currently relies on crude, inexact methods to evaluate 
specific causation. For example, courts rely on “differential 
                                                          
60 Courts in several cases have indicated that such extrapolations would be 
possible if a plaintiff can show that two health endpoints involve similar 
molecular pathways. See, e.g., Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 
1106, 1116 n.16 (5th Cir. 1991) (rejecting plaintiff’s attempt to argue, based “on 
the nature of the biochemical reaction,” that defendant’s chemicals can cause 
small-cell carcinoma of the lung would be relevant to show the same chemicals 
can also cause small-cell carcinoma of the colon, from which plaintiff suffered, 
because plaintiff failed to introduce sufficient evidence supporting this alleged 
biochemical relatedness); Austin v. Kerr-McGee Refining Corp., 25 S.W.3d 
280, 288 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that the plaintiff could not rely on 
evidence that benzene causes one type of leukemia to show that benzene must 
also cause a different type of leukemia because plaintiff had failed to show 
adequately that the two types of leukemia derived from the same genetic 
mutation). 
61 For so-called signature diseases, which are almost always caused by the 
same specific exposure, the question of what caused the disease in a particular 
individual is elementary. Such signature diseases are uncommon, however, and 
examples include mesothelioma caused by asbestos or clear cell 
adenocarcinoma caused by the drug DES. See Daniel A. Farber, Toxic 
Causation, 71 MINN. L. REV. 1219, 1251-52 (1987). 
62 Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 715 (Tex. 1997). 
See also In re “Agent Orange” Product Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 834 
(E.D.N.Y. 1984) (“[I]t may be impossible to pinpoint which particular person’s 
cancer would have occurred naturally and which would not have occurred but 
for exposure to the substance.”); Steve Gold, Causation in Toxic Torts: Burdens 
of Proof, Standards of Persuasion, and Statistical Evidence, 96 YALE L.J. 376, 
379 (1986) (“Cancers and mutations provide no physical evidence of the 
inducing agent, so direct observation of individual plaintiffs provides little or no 
evidence of causation in many instances.”). 
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diagnosis,”63 or require that an epidemiology study demonstrate a 
relative risk greater than two, before the fact finder can infer that it 
is more likely than not as a statistical matter that the exposure 
caused the illness incurred by a specific plaintiff.64 
Gene expression data may be able to provide for the first time 
direct data linking a specific individual’s exposure to the 
development or manifestation of a resulting toxic effect in that 
same individual. Initial studies have demonstrated that toxic 
substances produce a “unique expression profile.”65 The detection 
of the specific expression profile in a plaintiff who claims to have 
been injured by exposure to the relevant toxic substance could 
provide compelling evidence of specific causation. Alternatively, 
the failure to detect such a profile in the plaintiff, or the discovery 
of gene expression profiles for other toxic agents, supports 
arguments against specific causation. In at least one case, a 
defendant successfully argued that the plaintiff lacked the specific 
types of genetic biomarkers that would allegedly be present if 
                                                          
63 See Joseph Sanders & Julie Machal-Fulks, The Admissibility of 
Differential Diagnosis Testimony to Prove Causation in Toxic Tort Cases: The 
Interplay of Adjective and Substantive Law, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 
108-09 (2001). Differential diagnosis was described by one court as follows: “a 
physician begins by ‘ruling in’ all scientifically plausible causes of the 
plaintiff’s injury. The physician then ‘rules out’ the least plausible causes of 
injury until the most likely cause remains. The final result of a differential 
diagnosis is the expert’s conclusion that a defendant’s product caused (or did not 
cause) the plaintiff’s injury.” Glastetter v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 252 F.3d 986, 
989 (8th Cir. 2001). 
64 Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Admissibility and Legal Sufficiency of 
Testimony about Differential Diagnosis (Etiology): of Under–and Over–
Estimations, 56 BAYLOR L. REV. 391, 397-405 (2004); Carruth & Goldstein, 
supra note 5, at 195-202. 
65 See, e.g., Jeffrey F. Waring et al., Microarray Analysis of Hepatotoxins 
in Vitro Reveals a Correlation Between Gene Expression Profiles and 
Mechanisms of Toxicity, 120 TOXICOL. LETT. 359, 367 (2001). See also Hisham 
K. Hamadeh et al., Prediction of Compound Signature Using High Density Gene 
Expression Profiling, 67 TOXICOL. SCI. 232 (2002) (disussing how microarray 
analysis was able to correctly identify 22 of 23 blinded chemicals based on their 
gene expression profiles). 
MARCHANT MACROED.DOC 4/6/2006  2:28 PM 
 GENETIC DATA IN TOXIC TORT LITIGATION 27 
 
defendant’s activities had caused the disease.66 
By shifting the specific causation inquiry from statistical rules 
of thumb or subjective medical assessments to molecular changes 
within the plaintiff’s own cells, genetic biomarkers such as gene 
expression signatures have the potential to make specific causation 
significantly more objective and reliable. It may even obviate the 
need for general causation, because if a party can directly show, 
using gene expression markers, that a particular toxic agent caused 
(or did not cause) his or her toxic response, that party establishes 
causation without any need to make a separate general causation 
finding.67 
3.  Recovery for “Latent Risks” 
Another toxic tort area where genomic biomarker data could 
potentially have a large impact is in support of claims brought by 
plaintiffs who are at an increased risk of disease as a result of toxic 
exposures, but who have not yet manifested clinical disease. These 
“latent risk” claims can seek compensation for an increased risk of 
disease, fear of developing disease, or medical monitoring. 
Whether and when to allow recovery for latent risks has been 
                                                          
66 For example, in Wells v. Shell Oil Co., the plaintiff claimed that benzene 
from defendant’s refinery caused his acute myleogenous leukemia (AML), but 
the jury was reportedly convinced by defendant’s argument that when benzene 
causes AML it does so via breaks in chromosomes five and seven, which were 
absent in this particular plaintiff. See Expert Testimony: Jury Returns Verdict for 
Oil Company After Testimony on Missing Disease Marker, 22 CHEM. REG. REP. 
(BNA) 193 (1998). 
67 Similarly, there is no general causation requirement in most traumatic 
injury cases because the general propensity of the technology or action involved 
is beyond dispute, and the only contested issue is whether it did cause the injury 
in the specific case. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR 
PHYSICAL HARM (BASIC PRINCIPLES), § 28 cmt. c(3) (Tentative Draft No. 2, 
March 25, 2002) (“In cases involving traumatic injuries, such as a broken bone 
following an automobile accident, the absence of other causal sets and better 
understanding of the causal mechanisms involved moots the necessity for 
independent proof of general causation beyond the ‘specific causation’ evidence 
in the case.”). 
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described as the most difficult problem confronting toxic torts.68 
Courts have generally imposed stringent prerequisites for such 
claims, based on policy considerations such as the need to prevent 
courts from being flooded with claims, many of which might be 
“trivial” or “comparatively unimportant,” as well as to protect 
defendants from being subjected to “unlimited and unpredictable 
liability.”69 In increased risk and fear of disease claims, for 
example, most courts require the plaintiff to demonstrate a “present 
injury”70 as well as to quantify a sufficient increase in risk.71 Many 
plaintiffs exposed to toxic substances are unable to make these 
demonstrations with the types of scientific evidence presently 
available, and their claims are accordingly precluded.72 
                                                          
68 Geoffrey C. Hazard, The Futures Problem, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1901, 
1901 (2000) (“Perhaps the most difficult problem in addressing mass torts is that 
of future claimants.”); Richard W. Wright, Causation, Responsibility, Risk, 
Probability, Naked Statistics, and Proof: Pruning the Bramble Bush by 
Clarifying the Concepts, 73 IOWA L. REV. 1001, 1067 (1988) (“[T]he most 
problematic area of current tort practice [involves] cases involving liability for 
risk exposure.”). 
69 Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 433 (1997) 
(explaining how courts generally deny recovery for latent risk claims because of 
policy concerns about defendants being subjected to “unlimited and 
unpredictable liability” and courts being overwhelmed with a “flood of 
comparatively unimportant claims”). 
70 E.g., Adams v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 783 F.2d 589, 591-93 (5th 
Cir. 1986); Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1219, 1226-27 (D. 
Mass. 1986). 
71 E.g., Abuan v. General Elec. Co., 3 F.3d 329, 334 (9th Cir. 1993) 
(holding that recovery is possible for increased risk only where plaintiff shows 
that toxic exposure will more likely than not result in disease); Gideon v. Johns-
Manville Sales Corp., 761 F.2d 1129, 1137-38 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding that 
increased risk of cancer must be more likely than not to occur for claim to be 
recognized); Ayers v. Twp. of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 308 (N.J. 1987) (rejecting 
a claim for unquantified enhanced risk of disease because of speculative nature 
of unquantified risk). 
72 See, e.g., Brafford v. Susquehanna Corp., 586 F. Supp. 14, 18 (D. Col. 
1984) (“[T]he inability to precisely quantify the extent of present damage to the 
chromosomes is a function of medical technology’s inability to make such a 
measure.”); Andrew R. Klein, A Model for Enhanced Risk Recovery in Tort, 56 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1173, 1179 (1999) (examining how threshold 
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Gene expression data can potentially help at-risk plaintiffs to 
demonstrate both a present injury and a sufficient increase in risk 
in appropriate cases.  Courts have adopted different approaches for 
defining “present injury,” but at least some jurisdictions permit an 
asymptomatic, subclinical effect to qualify as a present injury.73 In 
those jurisdictions, gene expression changes will provide a 
powerful new technology for demonstrating subcellular injury.  A 
critical issue in this application of toxicogenomic data will be in 
distinguishing subcellular changes that are truly representative of a 
toxic response as opposed to a reversible adaptive response that is 
not associated with an increased risk to the individual.74 In the near 
future, the type and degree of gene expression changes may be 
used in quantifying an individual’s increased risk. Increased risk 
and fear of disease claims will likely become more sustainable in 
future cases due to toxicogenomic data’s potential to help plaintiffs 
overcome evidentiary hurdles to these type claims. 
Genetic biomarkers are also likely to spur more medical 
monitoring claims, which are already recognized in at least 
seventeen States and the District of Columbia.75 In order to make 
                                                          
requirements imposed by courts create “a nearly insurmountable barrier for 
enhanced risk plaintiffs”). 
73 See, e.g., Anderson, 628 F. Supp. at 1226-27 (explaining that a present 
injury must be “manifested by objective symptomatology,” but subcellular 
injuries could meet this standard if they were “objectively evidenced”); 
Brafford, 586 F. Supp. at 17-18 (denying summary judgment against plaintiff 
who relied on an inference that he must have incurred subcellular chromosomal 
damage from radiation exposure); Bryson v. Pillsbury Co., 573 N.W.2d 718, 
720-21 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998) (noting that asymptomatic, subcellular injury may 
constitute a legally recognized present injury). Other jurisdictions have held that 
subclinical effects cannot constitute a present injury. See, e.g., Dodge v. Cotter 
Corp., 203 F.3d 1190, 1202 (10th Cir. 2000) (requiring evidence of “a chronic 
objective condition caused by their increased risk of developing cancer” to 
permit recovery for emotional distress damages); Schweitzer v. Consolidated 
Rail Corp., 758 F.2d 936, 942 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding that subclincial injury 
insufficient for recovery); In re Hawaii Federal Asbestos Cases, 734 F. Supp. 
1563, 1567 (D. Hawaii 1990) (requiring “an objectively verifiable functional 
impairment”). 
74 Findings and Recommendations of a Workshop, supra note 53, at 1049. 
75 See Badillo v. Am. Brands, Inc., 16 P.3d 435, 438-39 (Nev. 2001) 
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such a claim an individual or class of individuals must have been 
exposed to a hazardous agent.76 A successful plaintiff is typically 
awarded funds from the responsible defendant to pay for ongoing 
medical monitoring tests to detect earlier, and hopefully treat more 
successfully, the onset of clinical disease.77 While different states 
have adopted slightly different criteria for such claims, most states 
require that plaintiffs pursuing such claims demonstrate an 
increased risk of disease from their exposure, that this increased 
risk makes periodic diagnostic medical examinations reasonably 
necessary, and that monitoring and diagnostic methods exist that 
make early detection and treatment of the disease both possible and 
beneficial.78 
Gene expression assays could potentially provide a valuable 
diagnostic test that could be used for medical monitoring. 
Alternatively, the abnormal results of a gene expression assay 
could be used to support a medical monitoring claim requesting 
continuous traditional clinical testing. In the first situation, the 
claim would be for funding of ongoing monitoring of gene 
expression changes that are the early indications that a serious 
toxicological response is progressing as a result of exposure to a 
hazardous substance. The gene expression changes of interest here 
would not be chemical-specific biomarkers of exposure, but rather 
biomarkers of effect that represent the early manifestations of 
disease. Detecting the development of such disease at the early, 
pre-clinical stage in exposed persons would be valuable if it 
permitted more effective and timely interventions. 
In the second situation, individuals whose gene expression 
assays identified them as having been hazardously exposed would 
be included within a class of plaintiffs seeking financial support for 
medical monitoring. The relevant biomarker here would be 
                                                          
(surveying medical monitoring case law). 
76 Victor E. Schwartz, Leah Lorber & Emily J. Laird, Medical Monitoring: 
The Right Way and the Wrong Way, 70 MO. L. REV. 349, 350 (2005). 
77 Id. at 353-54. 
78 See, e.g., In re Asbestos Cases, 265 F.3d 861, 866 (9th Cir. 2001); In re 
Paoli R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829, 852 (3d Cir. 1990); Hansen v. 
Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 858 P.2d 970, 979 (Utah 1993). 
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chemical-specific markers of exposure. Individuals lacking the 
biomarker as revealed by gene expression assays might be 
excluded from such recovery. In this way, gene expression assays 
may provide a more accurate and fair measure for determining who 
should be included in medical monitoring classes and who should 
not. Of course, the medical monitoring would only be justified 
under the existing legal standards if the plaintiffs were able to 
show that the gene expression changes they experienced 
represented a sufficient increased risk, and if there were a useful 
diagnostic test available for monitoring the clinical development of 
the disease in such individuals. 
By providing a sensitive and objective pre-clinical marker of 
risk, gene expression assays have the potential to greatly expand 
the number of plaintiffs with valid medical monitoring and other 
latent risk claims. To the extent that the increased frequency and 
precision of medical monitoring can better identify at-risk 
individuals and provide more effective preventive or therapeutic 
interventions, this technology has great potential for reducing 
disease and suffering. To the extent other types of latent risk 
claims, such as increased risk and fear of disease, can provide 
compensation to deserving plaintiffs who might otherwise be 
precluded from recovery when latent diseases manifests years or 
decades later, such claims might enhance the corrective justice and 
deterrence goals of tort law.79 
On the other hand, one concern with an increased number of 
such claims is the limited capacity of courts to handle these 
cases.80 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recently noted 
                                                          
79 See, e.g., David Gerecke, Risk Exposure as Injury: Alleviating the 
Injustice of Tort Causation Rules, 35 MCGILL L. J. 797 (1990); Christopher H. 
Schroeder, Corrective Justice and Liability for Increasing Risks, 37 UCLA L. 
REV. 439 (1990). But see Stephen R. Perry, Risk, Harm, and Responsibility, in 
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 321, 330-39 (David G. Owen ed., 
1995) (arguing against cause of action for risk in absence of symptomatic 
injury). 
80 See, e.g., Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 
442 (1997) (“[T]ens of millions of individuals may have suffered exposure to 
substances that might justify some form of substance-exposure-related medical 
monitoring.”); In re Rezulin Prod. Liab. Litig., 365 F. Supp. 2d 268, 275 
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such “floodgate” concerns in refusing to recognize chromosomal 
damage objectively demonstrated by chromosome tests on blood 
samples from the plaintiffs who had been exposed to radioactive 
substances at a uranium-enrichment plant: 
[T]he most persuasive reason to deny the plaintiffs’ claims 
in the present case comes from public policy considerations 
. . . . Given that negligently distributed or discharged toxins 
can be perceived to lie around every corner in the modern 
industrialized world, and their effects on risk levels are at 
best speculative, the potential tort claims involved are 
inherently limitless and endless. Accepting the plaintiffs’ 
claim would therefore throw open the possibility of 
litigation by any person experiencing even the most benign 
subcellular damage. Based upon the average American’s 
exposure to chemically processed foods, toxic fumes, 
genetically modified fruits and vegetables, mercury-laden 
fish, and hormonally treated chicken and beef, this might 
encompass a very large percentage of the total population.81 
Thus, as genetic science increasingly provides plaintiffs the tools 
to meet the factual prerequisites for latent disease claims under 
current law, the legal evidentiary and risk thresholds for bringing 
such claims may need to be tightened even further to avoid over-
running the courts with such claims and to ensure judicial and 
defendant resources are focused on the most deserving claims. 
                                                          
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (declining to recognize asymptomatic subcellular harm as a 
present injury in part because of concerns about impacts on the legal system’s 
limited resources); Henry v. The Dow Chem. Co., 701 N.W.2d 684, 696 (Mich. 
2005) (rejecting recognition of medical monitoring claims in Michigan because 
of potential for flood of litigation and harm to the state’s economy). 
81 Rainer v. Union Carbide Corp., 402 F.3d 608, 621 (6th Cir. 2005) 
(quotations and citations omitted). See also Andrew R. Klein, Fear of Disease 
and the Puzzle of Futures Cases in Tort, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 965, 966 n.2 
(2002) (collecting statistics on large percentages of population who have been 
exposed to various toxic agents); Arvin Maskin, Konrad L. Cailteux & Joanne 
M. McLaren, Medical Monitoring: A Viable Remedy for Deserving Plaintiffs or 
Tort Law’s Most Expensive Consolation Prize?, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 521, 
528 (2000) (listing toxic exposures which most Americans have experienced). 
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III. REFLECTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The many potential applications of genomic data in toxic tort 
litigation will not be without controversy and obstacles. One 
challenge will be the incentives for the premature use of genomic 
data that has not been adequately validated. Given the often 
substantial stakes and one-time nature of toxic tort litigation, 
litigants will likely seek to use any potentially helpful data even if 
its significance is not yet adequately understood. Trial judges will 
need to carefully evaluate the admissibility of genomic data under 
the criteria provided in the U.S. Supreme Court’s Daubert 
decision,82 including whether the data have been peer-reviewed 
and published, the rate of error of the methods, the “fit” or 
relevance of the data to the issue being litigated, and the general 
acceptance of the methodology.83 Judges might look to policy 
statements on genomic data issued by federal regulatory agencies 
such as the Environmental Protection Agency and Food and Drug 
Administration which are currently starting to utilize such data 
themselves.84 In addition, the National Academy of Sciences is 
currently examining potential applications of toxicogenomics, and 
judges may find guidance provided by this authoritative scientific 
organization helpful in making admissibility decisions.85 While 
caution and vigilance will be needed to guard against premature 
use of genomic data in tort litigation, such data should not be 
subjected to a higher standard of admissibility than other 
toxicological data currently used to prove or disprove exposure, 
causation, and damages, which are often of poor reliability and 
                                                          
82 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
83 Id. at 580. 
84 SCIENCE POLICY COUNCIL, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, 
INTERIM POLICY ON GENOMICS (June 25, 2002), http://www.epa. 
gov/osa/spc/pdfs/genomics.pdf; FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, GUIDANCE 
FOR INDUSTRY: PHARMACOGENOMIC DATA SUBMISSIONS (March 2005), 
http://www.fda.gov/cder/guidance/6400fnl.pdf. 
85 The NAS project is entitled “Applications of Toxicogenomic 
Technologies to Predictive Toxicology,” and is expected to issue its report by 
mid-2006. See http://www4.nas.edu/cp.nsf/Projects% 20_by%20_PIN/BEST-K-
03-09-A?OpenDocument. 
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accuracy.86 
Genomic data could also have important consequences for the 
types of claims brought in toxic tort cases. As the capability to 
identify our individual genetic differences in susceptibility to toxic 
substances increases, there is likely to be a growing number of 
cases arguing that product manufacturers have a duty to test for, 
warn about, or protect against genetic susceptibilities to their 
products. While it seems unreasonable to require that a 
manufacturer must protect the most ultra-susceptible individual in 
the entire population, it also seems unreasonable that a 
manufacturer could simply ignore differences in susceptibility 
within the population especially as such variations become better 
known and established. How the limits of manufacturer 
responsibility should and will be drawn remains to be seen. Latent 
disease claims will also probably grow exponentially as we 
develop the capability to detect objective, genetic markers of 
exposure and effect in individuals who have been exposed to toxic 
substances. Courts and legislatures will likely face difficult choices 
about whether and how to limit such claims in order to avoid 
overwhelming both court dockets and manufacturer coffers while 
also fulfilling the tort goals that such claims are intended to 
advance.87 
                                                          
86 Carl F. Cranor & David A. Eastmond, Scientific Ignorance and Reliable 
Patterns of Evidence in Toxic Tort Causation: Is There a Need for Liability 
Reform?, 64-AUT LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 7 (2001) (scientific ignorance 
and the slow accumulation of knowledge make proving causation difficult”). 
None of the major types of evidence introduced in toxic tort cases are capable of 
“proving conclusively a cause and effect relationship between plaintiff’s 
exposure to defendant’s product and plaintiff’s impaired health” and thus 
“[e]vidence of this kind is inherently subject to considerable uncertainty and 
inconclusiveness.” PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO’S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN 
THE COURTROOM (1991) (arguing that too much “junk science” is being relied 
on in toxic tort litigation). See, e.g., Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 
1188, 1208 (6th Cir. 1988) (clinical ecology evidence that plaintiffs relied on 
lacked sufficient scientific basis to permit an opinion on the plaintiffs’ immune 
system dysfunction). 
87 The current controversy over latent risk claims relating to asbestos 
exposure gives a flavor of the difficult issues to be faced by the proliferation of 
latent risk claims. See, e.g., James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, 
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Another important set of issues raised by the utility of genomic 
data are the privacy and discrimination risks to plaintiffs whose 
genetic information is placed into evidence. Genetic information is 
personal and sensitive, and often individuals do not want to know 
their own genetic traits, never mind having other people gaining 
access to such information.88 In toxic tort litigation, the plaintiff, 
whose genetic information is relevant, will almost always bear the 
privacy risks involved, because the case centers on the plaintiff’s 
health status. Nevertheless, a blanket prohibition on any use of 
genomic data in order to protect plaintiffs’ confidentiality would 
be unwise, because both plaintiffs and defendants can benefit from 
such data in appropriate cases. Furthermore, plaintiffs who put 
their health status at issue by bringing the litigation cannot expect 
such a blanket prohibition. 
Focused and scientifically-justified genetic inquiries and tests 
can help to resolve some lawsuits. For example, in the Benlate 
litigation discussed above,89 the defendant identified a specific 
genetic trait it believed caused the plaintiff’s injury, and then 
sought and obtained judicial permission to genetically test the 
plaintiff for that specific trait, which resolved the case.90 In 
contrast, broader and more intrusive “fishing expeditions” into the 
plaintiff’s genome that lack any probable cause in terms of having 
a reasonable basis for investigating a specific gene or trait are 
likely to create more mischief than insight needed to resolve a 
                                                          
Asbestos Litigation Gone Mad: Exposure-Based Recovery for Increased Risk, 
Mental Distress, and Medical Monitoring, 53 S.C. L. REV. 815 (2002) 
(discussing how the “massive, never-ending que of claimants” litigating latent 
risk claims for asbestos exposure has “become a tragic chapter in American 
jurisprudence” and “will remain so unless courts put an end to the madness.”). 
88 See Ronald M. Green & A. Mathew Thomas, DNA: Five Distinguishing 
Features for Policy Analysis, 11 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 571, 572 (1998) 
(describing “informational risks” from finding out genetic information about 
one’s self that a person may prefer not to know). 
89 See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
90 Bowen v. E.I. Dupont, No. Civ. A. 97C 06-194, 2005 WL 1952859, at *5 
(Del. Super. Ct. June 23, 2005). The trial judge initially denied defendant’s 
motion for genetic testing of the plaintiff, but then agreed to the testing over the 
plaintiff’s objection on a motion for reconsideration. Id. 
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case. 
Courts must use their discretion, therefore, to determine which 
genetic tests and data are justified, and also to provide for 
protective orders in appropriate cases to prevent disclosure of a 
plaintiff’s genetic information to non-parties.91 Enactment of 
pending legislation to provide legal protection against 
discrimination based on genetic data would also be helpful.92 
Finally, as the use of genomics in toxic torts begins to accelerate, 
plaintiffs’ attorneys may soon have an ethical duty to notify their 
clients whose health is at issue that they may be required to submit 
to genetic testing in pursuing their claims.  In sum, genetic data 
will present courts with both great opportunities and serious 
challenges to ensure that such information is used in a sound, 
effective and ethical manner. 
CONCLUSION 
Genomic data have the potential to transform toxic tort 
doctrine and practice.  There are many potential applications of 
genomic data in toxic tort litigation, and the doctrinal templates 
and analogies for most of these applications already exist. We can 
therefore expect genetic data to be introduced more frequently in 
future cases, and once such data have been ruled admissible and 
have affected the outcome in a few notable cases, there will likely 
be a flood of cases utilizing such data. By replacing crude 
assumptions, subjective guesses, and “toxic ignorance” with 
objective and individualized data on a particular plaintiff’s 
exposure, toxicity response, and susceptibility, genomic data have 
enormous potential to make toxic tort litigation more informed, 
consistent and fair. At the same time, the widespread use of 
genomic data in toxic tort will create a number of doctrinal, ethical 
and institutional dilemmas for courts and toxic tort attorneys.  
These issues will have to be managed effectively before the 
                                                          
91 See Marchant, Genetic Susceptibility, supra note 9, at 106-08; 
Niedwiecki, supra note 35, at 345-46; Rothstein, supra note 36, at 900-01. 
92 Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2005, H.R. 1227, 109th 
Cong. (2005). 
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promise and potential of genomic data in toxic tort litigation will 
be realized. 
  
 
